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According to assignment theory, the returns to investments in human
capital vary dramatically with the quality of the match between the worker
and the job (see Sattinger 1993; Belman and Heywood 1997). Mismatches
between worker skills and job requirements have substantial costs as work-
ers are either unable to fulﬁll job requirements or have skills that go un-
used. Mismatches waste educational resources, resulting in dissatisﬁed
workers (Tsang 1987) and higher turnover (McGoldrick and Robst 1996).
Lower job satisfaction and higher turnover may reduce formal training
and lower labor productivity, and so ﬁrms’ proﬁts (Groot 1993; Sloane,
Battu, and Seaman 1996). Finally, frustration over being mismatched may
independently reduce worker eﬀort (Belﬁeld 2000).
In this chapter we focus on workers with a Ph.D. in science and examine
the predicted consequences of mismatch. First, we examine these workers
because they play a key role in innovation and creating technological prog-
ress. As a consequence, economists have estimated the determinants of
productivity for scientists (Levin and Stephan 1991), the adequacy of their
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this chapter.2003; Teitelbaum 2004) and the rewards to their education (Stephan and
Everhart 1998). Second, the homogeneity of this sample allows us to con-
trol for variables excluded from typical estimates in examining the conse-
quences of mismatch. Third, managers concerned with maximizing the im-
pact of their research and development staﬀ need to understand the
relationship between mismatch and job satisfaction, since it inﬂuences pro-
ductivity (Kim and Oh 2002). Finally, substantial governmental resources
are devoted to educating these workers and to improving their diversity.
Yet concern continues as the growth in U.S. university students pursuing
advanced degrees in science slows and as trained scientists increasingly
abandon scientiﬁc careers (Preston 2004).
We are the ﬁrst to use this group of workers to examine the three major
consequences that have been identiﬁed with mismatch: lower earnings,
lower job satisfaction, and turnover. The ﬁndings are striking. Mismatch is
associated with lower earnings, reduced job satisfaction, and greater
turnover even after controlling for a wide range of other explanatory vari-
ables and even given the relative homogeneity of our sample.
Several major categories of theoretical conjecture explain why mis-
matches between workers and jobs persist in equilibrium. First, government
subsidization may result in “overeducation” in which the general level of ed-
ucational attainment exceeds that demanded (Freeman 1976). While this
may create a surplus, it is less transparent why the wage will not fall to clear
the surplus. Second, there may be information problems. If productivity is
not known or is revealed only over a lengthy period, workers may remain
mismatched based on signals that need not reﬂect their true productivity
(Tsang and Levin 1985). Similarly, search and information costs may be
large enough that workers remain mismatched as a cheaper alternative to
searching for a new job or to the ﬁrm searching for a new employee. Third,
institutional theories of the labor market have long contended that internal
labor market considerations force employers to base earnings on easily ob-
servable characteristics of the worker and job (Thurow 1975). Thus, institu-
tional issues within the ﬁrm help determine pay and allow mismatches to re-
main, especially when speciﬁc human capital investments bind the worker
and ﬁrm together across a wide range of pay and productivity relationships.
These concerns may be particularly prominent in science occupations in
which the skill vintage changes rapidly, hastening worker mismatch. Alter-
natively, these concerns may be less prominent if those in science occupa-
tions are more likely to have earnings that reﬂect performance. Finally, jobs
in science occupations may represent tournament winnings. Only the best
are able to be carefully matched to their training and pursue continued em-
ployment. The mismatched in this view may be less able and, indeed, mis-
match may even be evidence of an eﬃcient tournament.
A large empirical literature attempts to measure the consequences of
230 Keith A. Bender and John S. Heywoodmismatch. While the measure by which workers have too much education
varies (Belﬁeld 2000, 35–37), Groot and Maasen van den Brink (2000) pro-
vide a meta-analysis showing that the overeducated suﬀer a 14 percent
earnings penalty (also see Chevalier 2003; Dolton and Vignoles 2000;
Battu, Belﬁeld, and Sloane 1999). Yet mismatch goes beyond overeduca-
tion. Borghans, Bruinshoofd, and de Grip (2000) show that workers hold-
ing a job unrelated to their ﬁeld of education suﬀer signiﬁcantly dimin-
ished earnings. Allen and van der Velden (2001) measure the wage eﬀects
of skill mismatches, controlling for both educational levels, and apparent
educational mismatches showing that those with unused skills earn signif-
icantly less.
Psychological theories of expectation suggest that underutilized skills
cause diminished job satisfaction. Those with the greatest education and
skills have the highest expectations for their jobs and careers and are more
easily disappointed (Tsang and Levin 1985; Clark and Oswald 1996).
Solomon et al. (1981) and Allen and van der Velden (2001) conﬁrm that
both underutilized skills and skill deﬁcits are associated with signiﬁcantly
diminished job satisfaction. Belﬁeld and Harris (2002) and Moshavi and
Terborg (2003) ﬁnd that the overeducated suﬀer diminished job satisfac-
tion. Yet the evidence remains mixed as Buchel (2002) presents German ev-
idence that overqualiﬁed employees have the same job satisfaction as those
properly matched.
Much of the original reason for examining subjective job satisfaction is
that it inﬂuences real economic variables including quit rates, shirking, and
absenteeism (Freeman 1978; Clark and Oswald 1996). Thus, mismatched
workers that have lower job satisfaction will be more likely to search for a
new job. Moreover, reduced productivity associated with mismatch may
encourage employers to seek alternative workers. The consequence is that
the turnover rate among the mismatched should be higher (Wolbers 2003;
Allen and van der Velden 2001).
Unlike the literature reviewed previously, we go beyond simply identify-
ing the consequences of mismatch to ask which reasons for being mis-
matched have the greatest consequences. We ﬁnd that those mismatched
because of the lack of jobs or family considerations suﬀer very large reduc-
tions in wages and job satisfaction. Women who are mismatched because of
family considerations have particularly large reductions in earnings.
We also estimate the causes of mismatch. The estimations suggest that
the vintage of scientiﬁc skills is a critical determinant. In general, scientists
are more likely to be mismatched, and the penalty for mismatch grows as
they age beyond the time of their degree. There is evidence of the tradi-
tional movement from the lab to management for workers in rapidly
changing disciplines and the indication that married men are least likely to
be mismatched, all else equal.
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We draw our primary data from the 1997 and 1999 Survey of Doctorate
Recipients (SDR) conducted by the National Opinion Research Center for
the National Science Foundation. The SDR is a nationally representative
sample of all Ph.D. graduates in the hard and social sciences, prior to 1997,
living in the United States. Collected in response to the National Research
Council’s demand for data that allows the integration of occupational de-
tail and academic training, the SDR is conducted every other year. The
1997 SDR asks about overall job satisfaction and is the only wave asking
what we identify as the secondary mismatch indicators. We selected all cur-
rently employed scientists for which full information was available, yield-
ing a sample of 31,845.1
The primary indicator of mismatch comes from responses to the ques-
tion, “Thinking about the relationship between your work and your edu-
cation, to what extent is your work related to your doctoral degree?” The
possible responses are “closely related,” “somewhat related,” and “not re-
lated.” Those scientists working in jobs not related to their education are
presumably using less of the knowledge, training, and skills learned in that
education. In this critical sense they may be identiﬁed as mismatched be-
cause there is not a close ﬁt between their education and job. As table 7.1
shows, only 7.3 percent of the sample report their education and job are
not at all related, although another 23.4 percent report that their education
and job are only somewhat related.
Two secondary mismatch indicators probe related aspects of the link be-
tween the workers’ scientiﬁc education and their current job. The ﬁrst asks,
“Thinking back to when you completed your degree would you say your
work during a typical week on your job is 1) very similar to what you ex-
pected to be doing, 2) somewhat similar to what you expected to be doing
or 3) not very similar to what you expected to be doing?” To the extent that
expectations upon completing the doctoral degree reﬂect the training and
experience in their ﬁeld, those who are far away from their expectations
may also be far away from their training or ﬁeld. Obviously, expectations
could be imperfect and, if so, one might expect a weaker relationship be-
tween this question and underlying mismatches. The means indicate that
20.6 percent report that their job is not very similar to what they expected,
with another 32.5 reporting that their job is only somewhat similar to what
they expected.
The other secondary question asks, “If you had the chance to do it over
again, knowing what you do now, how likely is it that you would choose the
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1. While much of the data from the SDR are publicly available, we add variables from the
restricted use version. These variables include annual earnings, detailed job codes, race/eth-
nicity, age, and marital status. See the SDR website at http://sestat.nsf.gov/ for details on both
versions of the SDR data.Table 7.1 Means of the variables
All Academic Nonacademic
Mismatch variables
Job and education 
closely related (excl) 0.693 0.835 0.564
Job and education related 0.234 0.141 0.319
Job and education not related 0.073 0.024 0.118
Job very similar to expectations 0.469 0.617 0.333
Job similar to expectations 0.325 0.289 0.359
Job not very similar to expectations 0.206 0.094 0.308
Very likely to choose similar ﬁeld 0.549 0.601 0.503
Somewhat likely to choose similar 
ﬁeld 0.302 0.281 0.320
Not likely to choose similar ﬁeld 0.149 0.118 0.177
Dependent variables
Annual salary $70,449 $59,881 $80,070
(48,905) (39,116) (54,608)
Satisfaction with job 3.399 3.426 3.373
(0.741) (0.734) (0.747)
Changed jobs 0.183 0.136 0.226
Demographic variables
Single male (excl) 0.130 0.127 0.132
Single female 0.097 0.114 0.080
Married female 0.186 0.214 0.160
Married male 0.587 0.546 0.628
White, non-Hispanic (excl) 0.818 0.832 0.805
Asian, non-Hispanic 0.133 0.108 0.155
Hispanic 0.023 0.027 0.019
Black, non-Hispanic 0.023 0.029 0.017
Other race, non-Hispanic 0.004 0.004 0.003
Experience 14.1 14.0 14.2
(10.3) (10.6) (10.0)
Experience squared 304.9 309.7 300.3
(375.1) (386.6) (363.4)
Northeast region 0.078 0.086 0.072
Middle Atlantic region 0.163 0.155 0.170
East North Central region 0.137 0.155 0.121
West North Central region 0.063 0.079 0.048
South Atlantic region 0.184 0.162 0.205
East South Central region 0.043 0.058 0.029
West South Central region 0.079 0.087 0.071
Mountain region 0.069 0.067 0.070
Paciﬁc region 0.182 0.149 0.213
Job variables
Supervisor 0.534 0.497 0.568
Full time employment 0.922 0.937 0.909
Pension is available 0.817 0.902 0.740
Proﬁt sharing is available 0.882 0.953 0.818
(continued)same ﬁeld of study for your highest degree?” The answers are “very likely,”
“somewhat likely,” and “not likely at all.” While this question might simply
be seen as identifying those who feel they made a bad career choice, it
seems reasonable that those who are mismatched would especially regret
their choice of ﬁeld. Consistent with evidence that scientists leave their ca-
reers in large numbers (Preston 2004), only slightly more than half of the
sample report being very likely to repeat their study for their highest de-
gree. In sum, these three questions reﬂect slightly diﬀerent aspects of the
relationship between education and the workers’ current positions. De-
spite these diﬀerences, the three measures appear highly correlated, as we
will show shortly.
Table 7.2 presents cross-tabulations of the two secondary measures of
mismatch with the primary measure. The top panel shows that the distri-
bution of expectations of the job given the education is broadly similar to
that of how closely the job and education relate. The diagonal terms are the
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Employer size   1,000 (excl) 0.261 0.117 0.392
Employer size   1,000 and   5,000 0.044 0.051 0.038
Employer size   5,000 0.695 0.831 0.571
Number of memberships in 
professional organization 2.472 2.943 2.042
(1.941) (2.021) (1.759)
Academic sector 0.477 1.000 0.000
Business sector (excl) 0.103 0.000 0.197
Government sector 0.420 0.000 0.803
Research is main work activity (excl) 0.407 0.371 0.439
Teaching is main work activity 0.218 0.450 0.007
Management is main work activity 0.161 0.092 0.225
Computer work is main work activity 0.048 0.013 0.080
Other main activity 0.166 0.073 0.250
Discipline indicators
Economics (excl) 0.030 0.040 0.020
Computer 0.040 0.006 0.071
Math 0.047 0.081 0.017
Hard science 0.328 0.392 0.269
Social science (not economics) 0.171 0.198 0.146
Engineering 0.135 0.093 0.172
Management 0.137 0.077 0.192
Health 0.028 0.023 0.032
Teacher 0.040 0.081 0.003
Other (nonscience) occupation 0.045 0.010 0.077
Notes: All means are weighted using sample weights. Numbers in parentheses are standard
deviations for continuous variables; “(excl)” indicates that this variable was a reference vari-
able in the regressions.
Table 7.1 (continued)
All Academic Nonacademiclargest within each column and comprise roughly 60 percent of the sample.
The distribution of the likelihood of repeating the same education is a bit
less similar to the primary indicator. The diagonal terms are not the largest
in two columns and comprise a smaller share of the sample. The less than
perfect correlation suggests the three measures capture somewhat diﬀerent
aspects of mismatch and that considering each may be valuable.
Using these measures, we investigate the eﬀect of mismatch on earnings,
job satisfaction, and job change. The earnings measure is annual earnings
in 1997 including all wages, salaries, bonuses, overtime, commissions, con-
sulting fees, and net income from business and has an average of over
$70,000. The critical question on job satisfaction asks, “How would you
rate your overall satisfaction with your principal job during the week of
April 15th?” The choices are “very dissatisﬁed,” “somewhat dissatisﬁed,”
“somewhat satisﬁed,” and “very satisﬁed.” These responses are ordered
values from 1 to 4 with an average of 3.4. Job change information comes
from the 1999 survey, which asks workers to identify one of the following:
(a) their current job is diﬀerent than that held in the 1997 survey but with
the same employer; (b) their current job is diﬀerent than that they held in
the 1997 but with a diﬀerent employer; (c) they hold the same job and em-
ployer as in 1997; or (d) they hold the same job with a diﬀerent employer.
We view positive answers to either of the ﬁrst two options as evidence of a
job change. A relatively large share of sample, 18.3 percent, changed jobs
within the two years. We also use only those who changed employers and
jobs as true job changes, and this does not alter the basic results.
The bottom portion of table 7.1 indicates the rich set of demographic
and job dimension variables that we use as controls in an eﬀort to isolate
the inﬂuence of the indicators of mismatch. These include race, gender,
marital status, regional variables, many job dimensions that might inﬂu-
ence earnings, job satisfaction, turnover, and indicators of discipline (see
Bender and Heywood [2006] for a detailed list of these indicators). Know-
ing the age of the respondent and the year of their Ph.D., we also derive an
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Table 7.2 Frequency distribution between three mismatch variables
How related is job and education?
Not closely  Closely Very closely 
related related related
Job not very similar to expectations 5.54 9.14 4.59
Job similar to expectations 0.79 10.67 21.59
Job very similar to expectations 0.64 3.65 43.39
Not likely to choose same ﬁeld 2.78 4.75 7.39
Somewhat likely to choose same ﬁeld 2.10 8.51 19.95
Very likely to choose same ﬁeld 2.09 10.21 42.23imputed measure of experience that we take to be an indicator of vintage
of training.
Table 7.3 collects the primary mismatch indicator, earnings, job satis-
faction, and turnover. The data are presented separately for each discipline
and divided between those holding academic and nonacademic jobs. Aca-
demics, in general, are much less likely to report any degree of mismatch
(this is true across all three mismatch indicators). Academic economists re-
port the lowest share of any degree mismatch at only 2.2 percent. Those
working in computer science report a very high degree of mismatch, with
two-thirds reporting a degree of mismatch. This may reﬂect a vintage eﬀect
in which the discipline changes very quickly, heightening the gap between
skills learned in school and those needed on the job. Such a possibility em-
phasizes the need to control for the years since degree (experience) for the
worker. The single highest degree of mismatch is among those nonaca-
demics working in “other disciplines.” This follows, in part, from con-
struction. This category includes disciplines other than those in the sci-
ences. Thus, workers in this category are necessarily working in disciplines
other than that in which they were trained.
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Table 7.3 Educational mismatch, earnings, job satisfaction, and turnover by discipline
and sector
% Closely % Very  Average salary  % Change
Discipline Sector related satisﬁed ($USD) jobs
All Academic 83.5 54.8 59,881 13.6
Nonacademic 56.4 50.9 80,070 22.6
Economics Academic 97.8 56.6 62,911 10.6
Nonacademic 76.5 55.1 88,308 19.5
Social science Academic 93.7 55.8 51,986 12.0
Nonacademic 88.7 55.7 63,918 14.6
Computer science Academic 38.4 59.9 63,172 26.9
Nonacademic 28.6 43.5 78,025 26.1
Math Academic 86.9 51.3 56,565 10.2
Nonacademic 68.7 50.2 76,758 18.2
Hard science Academic 85.9 54.1 56,067 14.4
Nonacademic 66.9 48.9 72,572 22.5
Engineering Academic 87.7 53.8 68,200 11.6
Nonacademic 57.2 44.7 80,444 22.3
Management Academic 55.7 63.9 90,202 18.4
Nonacademic 41.9 57.4 104,885 29.3
Health Academic 50.5 55.6 80,098 19.9
Nonacademic 39.8 58.1 101,106 13.7
Other disciplines Academic 35.0 45.0 39,462 22.9
Nonacademic 17.4 48.6 65,627 23.6
Note: “% Change jobs” includes those who changed jobs regardless of whether or not they changed em-
ployers.In terms of the outcome variables, those groups with better matches—a
closer ﬁt between education and job—on average also have higher job sat-
isfaction and lower job change. For example, academics, who say that they
are better matched on average, report modestly higher job satisfaction and
have much lower turnover. On the other hand, although more highly
matched, academics earn less than nonacademics in every discipline. Fur-
ther investigation, simultaneously controlling for other determinants of
earnings, is warranted to see if this correlation holds.
7.3 Consequences of Mismatch
Table 7.4 presents typical log-linear earnings equations revealing a
number of anticipated results. As expected in a sample of the highly skilled,
the racial differences are small or simply absent. Supervisors, married
men, those receiving pensions and working full time each earn more. Mar-
ried women earn less than single men in the academic sector, while single
women earn less than single men in the nonacademic sector. Those work-
ing in the government earn less than those working in the private nonaca-
demic sector. Experience shows the standard concave pattern with earn-
ings. Thus, for the academics in the sample, the experience coeﬃcients do
not reﬂect Ransom’s (1993) ﬁnding that higher seniority for university pro-
fessors is associated with lower salaries, all else equal.
The results indicate that among academics, those who view their primary
activity as teaching earn less and that only those in management science
earn more than the excluded group, economists. Although not reported,
those in hard science earn more than 20 percent less than economists, with
the gap larger in percentage terms in the nonacademic sector than in the
academic sector.
Importantly, a large decrement in earnings is associated with the critical
mismatch variables. If academic workers report that their education only
relates somewhat, their earnings are 6.9 percent lower holding, all else
equal.2 The comparable earnings penalty for nonacademic workers is 4.7
percent. If academic workers report that their education does not relate,
their earnings are 13.8 percent lower. The comparable earnings penalty for
nonacademic workers is 9.8 percent. The greater penalty in academia may
reﬂect a greater importance of appropriate educational credentials or it
may be that academic jobs not in a worker’s Ph.D. ﬁeld reﬂect a greater de-
gree of mismatch than is true for nonacademic jobs. Recalling that at least
one consensus estimate of the penalty associated with overeducation was
14 percent, we are estimating a mismatch penalty of roughly the same size.
This is surprising, as those estimates were taken to measure the inﬂuence
of having an unnecessary degree. While that may be true for some of our
Educational Mismatch among Ph.D.s  237













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.mismatched workers, it need not be. Workers need only report that they are
working in an area (a subject matter) outside their degree.
Job satisfaction measures force workers to consider elements of the job
in addition to earnings. These elements include fringe beneﬁts, interactions
with coworkers, the value of the work itself, relations with supervisors,
hours, and intrinsic rewards to name only a few. As Hamermesh (2000) ar-
gues, job satisfaction measures, at their best, hope to capture the sum of
utility derived from all aspects of the job.
As the job satisfaction measure is an ordered response, the estimation
follows a cumulative normal in an ordered probit. The results in table 7.4
conﬁrm some expectations from past work on job satisfaction but present
a few surprises. Women do not emerge as the routinely “contented work-
ers” that estimations on general populations often report (Clark 1997).
Both single and married women in academic jobs have the same job satis-
faction as single men while only married women in nonacademic jobs re-
port greater job satisfaction than single men.3Married men routinely show
greater job satisfaction than single men. Blacks report lower job satisfac-
tion as do those working for larger employers. Many of the other results
roughly follow the wage equations with supervisors, those working full
time, and those with pensions all reporting higher job satisfaction. The
pattern of discipline eﬀects (suppressed to save space) also follows familiar
lines, with those in engineering and the hard sciences reporting lower job
satisfaction than the excluded group (economists), and those in manage-
ment reporting higher job satisfaction. The experience results do not fol-
low the wage equation, with job satisfaction declining with experience but
at a decreasing rate in the nonacademic sector. Job satisfaction declines
well into mid-career before starting to rebound for these workers. Ward
and Sloane (2000) ﬁnd that satisfaction with salary decreases with age for
male academics while the more general studies conﬁrm that job satisfac-
tion is lowest for those in middle age.
The mismatch variables are associated with substantially lower job sat-
isfaction. For both academics and nonacademics, working in jobs not re-
lated to their education is associated with a highly signiﬁcant and large 
reduction in overall job satisfaction. The magnitude of this inﬂuence is
understood by making projections. If we assume all variables are held at
their mean levels except the mismatch variables, we can use the cut points
and project the probability of being in each satisfaction level. As an illus-
tration, if we assume that academic workers have the mean characteristics
and are in jobs closely related to their education, they have a 0.655 proba-
bility of reporting the highest level of satisfaction, which is very satisﬁed. If
240 Keith A. Bender and John S. Heywood
3. Bender and Heywood (2006) show that while women academics report lower job satis-
faction than men, women in government report the same satisfaction as men and women in
business report greater satisfaction than men.they hold jobs only somewhat related to their education, the probability of
reporting being very satisﬁed drops to 0.543. Finally, if they hold a job not
at all related to their education, the probability of reporting being very sat-
isﬁed is only 0.428. A complete set of projections is available from the
authors, but it is apparent that the marginal inﬂuence of mismatch on job
satisfaction is very large.
As discussed, one advantage of the SDR is the ability to follow the work-
ers two years after the 1997 survey to determine whether or not they have
changed their job. This measure of turnover is a dichotomous measure and
becomes the dependent variable in probit speciﬁcations as shown in the
last two columns of table 7.4. These estimations repeat some familiar pat-
terns. Those who are supervisors and have fringe beneﬁts are less likely to
have changed jobs, with the latter perhaps reﬂecting deferred compensa-
tion that binds workers to employers.4 Job change becomes less likely with
experience but eventually turns around and becomes more likely later in
life. Married women in nonacademic jobs are more likely to change jobs
than single males. Black workers appear no more likely to change jobs than
do white workers, while those in large ﬁrms are more likely to change jobs.
The critical mismatch variables reveal that those working positions not
related to their education have a higher probability of turnover than those
in positions closely related to their education: 8.7 percentage points higher
for academics and 6.3 percentage points higher for nonacademics. Given
that the average turnover rate across the two subsamples is slightly above
18 percent, these are very large marginal eﬀects. Again, there is a more
muted eﬀect for a worker being in a ﬁeld only somewhat related to their ed-
ucation. Among academics, these workers are 4.3 percentage points more
likely to change jobs and among nonacademics, these workers are 4.2 per-
centage points more likely to change jobs. The marginal eﬀects for both of
these degrees of mismatch are statistically signiﬁcant for each subsample.5
Our examination of the consequences of mismatch presents a consistent
picture. Using this primary indicator of mismatch, we ﬁnd routine and ro-
bust partial correlations. Mismatch remains associated with lower wages,
lower job satisfaction, and an increased probability of changing jobs.
7.3.1 Other Indicators of Mismatch
The other survey measures related to mismatch present a similar, if
slightly less dramatic, picture. Our estimates of the earnings equations
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4. Such an implication makes sense to the extent that pensions are back-loaded (as in de-
ﬁned beneﬁt plans—see Lazear [1979]) and to the extent that health insurance creates “job
lock,” making mobility diﬃcult (Adams 2004).
5. We altered our deﬁnition of job change, restricting it to include only those workers who
simultaneously changed jobs and employers. This removes normal promotions from being
classiﬁed as job changes but runs the risk of excluding real job changes within an employer.
The mismatch coeﬃcients remain statistically signiﬁcant and of the same direction. Mis-
match continues to increase the probability of job change.used precisely the same set of controls as reported in table 7.4 but merely
replaced the mismatch variables with their alternatives. As the ﬁrst panel in
table 7.5 shows in speciﬁcation 2, academics who ﬁnd their work not very
similar to their expectations at the time of degree completion have 9.6 per-
cent lower earnings while nonacademics who ﬁnd their work not very sim-
ilar to their expectations have 8.5 percent lower earnings. Academics who
report that they would not be very likely to repeat their Ph.D. degree in the
same ﬁeld have 8.0 percent lower earnings while those nonacademics who
report the same thing have 8.8 percent lower earnings when compared to
those very likely to repeat their degree. All of the coeﬃcients from which
these percentage measures are taken are statistically signiﬁcant at the one
percent level and serve to further conﬁrm the suggestion that mismatch
among the highly educated is associated with reduced earnings.
The results on job satisfaction are more dramatic, with substantially
larger declines than those associated with the original mismatch indicator.
Academics whose work is not very similar to their expectations have a 31.1
percentage point reduction in the probability of being in the highest satis-
faction category compared to those whose work is similar to their expec-
tations (this is now a marginal eﬀect). Nonacademics whose work is not
very similar to their expectations have a 29.4 percentage point reduction in
the probability of being in the highest satisfaction category. Those aca-
demics not very likely to repeat their degree have a 40.5 percentage point
reduction in the probability of being in the highest satisfaction category
and those nonacademics whose work is not similar to expectations have a
31.0 percentage point reduction in the same probability. While these sec-
ondary measures may simply be alternative satisfaction measures, it re-
mains possible that they capture important elements of mismatch as each
directs the respondent to compare their work to an aspect of their educa-
tion. To the extent this is correct, the results serve to conﬁrm those pre-
sented with the original indicator.
The two secondary measures of mismatch also reinforce the results on
job turnover. Those academics whose expectations are not very similar are
6.9 percentage points more likely to change jobs and those nonacademics
whose expectations are not very similar are 11.5 percentage points more
likely to change jobs. Academics who would not be likely to repeat their
graduate education are 4.5 percentage points more likely to change jobs
and nonacademics who are not very likely to repeat their graduate educa-
tion are 7.0 percentage points more likely to change jobs compared to
those who are very likely to repeat their graduate education. Thus, the sec-
ondary measures show a somewhat diﬀerent pattern on job change that
suggests that mismatch is more likely to result in job change for nonaca-
demics than for academics. Nonetheless, the general patterns are similar
across all three measures and across all three consequences. All of the
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Academic Nonacademic
Log annual earnings regression
Speciﬁcation 1 Education relates  0.073***  0.056***
( 5.70) ( 4.72)
Education does not relate  0.167***  0.117***
( 4.38) ( 5.44)
Speciﬁcation 2 Similar to expectations  0.032***  0.058***
( 3.77) ( 4.86)
Not very similar  0.107***  0.089***
( 5.87) ( 6.25)
Speciﬁcation 3 Somewhat likely  0.047***  0.060***
( 5.48) ( 5.14)
Not very likely  0.083***  0.092***
( 6.49) ( 6.02)
Job satisfaction ordered probit regression (marginal eﬀects)
Speciﬁcation 1 Education relates  0.132***  0.142***
( 9.54) ( 13.91)
Education does not relate  0.212***  0.187***
( 7.16) ( 11.71)
Speciﬁcation 2 Similar to expectations  0.237***  0.203***
( 23.89) ( 19.09)
Not very similar  0.311***  0.294***
( 20.20) ( 23.80)
Speciﬁcation 3 Somewhat likely  0.238***  0.180***
( 23.93) ( 18.23)
Not very likely  0.405***  0.310***
( 37.57) ( 28.62)
Change jobs probit regression (marginal eﬀects)
Speciﬁcation 1 Education relates 0.043*** 0.042***
(3.62) (3.49)
Education does not relate 0.087*** 0.063***
(3.10) (3.30)
Speciﬁcation 2 Similar to expectations 0.036*** 0.072***
(4.02) (5.50)
Not very similar 0.069*** 0.115***
(4.21) (7.45)
Speciﬁcation 3 Somewhat likely 0.038*** 0.027**
(4.23) (2.31)
Not very likely 0.045*** 0.070***
(3.53) (4.77)
Notes: Each speciﬁcation includes the covariates listed in table 7.4 through 7.6, except where
the measures of educational mismatch are replaced by the mismatch measures listed in this
table. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics (for the earnings regression) or asymptotic 
z-statistics (job satisfaction and change jobs regressions). The results for the job satisfaction
ordered probits are marginal eﬀects of the probability of being in the highest job satisfaction
category, holding all other variables at their mean value.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.coeﬃcients for both levels of mismatch are statistically signiﬁcant at the
one percent level.
7.3.2 The Role of Reasons for Mismatch
In this section we expand the dimensions of mismatch, including in the
analysis the reasons that workers see themselves as mismatched. The SDR
asks each respondent who identiﬁes themselves as in a job that does not at
all relate to their education what is the most important reason why they
have taken such a job. The reasons (with percentages giving that reason in
parentheses) include: better pay and promotion opportunities (20.3 per-
cent, better working conditions (4.2 percent), the job’s location (4.7 per-
cent), family-related reasons (5.8 percent), a job is not available in their
doctoral ﬁeld (24.5 percent), a change in career/professional interests (28.6
percent), or other (11.9 percent). The vast majority of workers cite one of
three responses: better pay and promotion, the lack of jobs, or changed in-
terests. We transform these into a series of dummy variables to replace the
previous general measure of job and education not at all related.
Table 7.6 summarizes earnings regressions in which the reasons for mis-
match replace simply being in a job not very closely related to one’s educa-
tion. It is clear that a change in career interests is associated with the small-
est decline in earnings, while being mismatched to improve pay and
promotion opportunities shows up increasing earnings. Once these are
controlled for, the other reasons for being mismatched are associated with
remarkably large declines in earnings. Approximately one-quarter of those
in jobs unrelated to their education identify no jobs in their ﬁeld and 7.3
percent of all respondents indicate that their jobs are unrelated to their ed-
ucation. Thus, slightly less than 2 percent of all doctoral recipients report
being mismatched because of a lack of jobs in their ﬁeld. These recipients
earn almost 20 percent less.
The diﬀerences by gender are dramatic. In general, the extremes are
more pronounced in the female sample. The gain associated with being
mismatched because of a desire for better pay and promotion shows
women earning nearly 21 percent more. At the same time, the loss associ-
ated with being mismatched because of family reasons is nearly 40 percent.
Women who cite their family as a reason for their job and education not
being related are clearly earning substantially less than what would other-
wise be the case.
The augmented job satisfaction estimates reveal that mismatch is never
associated with greater job satisfaction even when it is associated with
greater pay or promotion opportunities. All but one of the coeﬃcients in
the right-hand side of table 7.6 are negative, including that on pay and pro-
motion opportunities. This pattern suggests that those who leave their doc-
toral discipline behind in order to earn more are not pleased with the deci-
sion (the coeﬃcient being strongly signiﬁcant for males). The need to meet
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come at the cost of not working in an area the scientist would rather pur-
sue.6 Indeed, Preston (2004) highlights just this kind of tradeoﬀ in explor-
ing those scientists who choose to work outside of science. While it need
not be the case that all of those mismatched in our sample have left science,
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6. While possible, we also note that these estimates are based on a cross-section and we do
not observe the counterfactual of these same workers actually pursuing jobs closely related to
their education.
Table 7.6 Selected earnings and job satisfaction regressions results: Simple and augmented for
reasons for mismatch
Log annual earnings Job satisfaction
Male Female Male Female
Speciﬁcation 1
Job-education somewhat related  0.064***  0.096***  0.143***  0.124***
( 6.24) ( 5.01) ( 15.00) ( 8.28)
Job-education not at all related  0.130***  0.173***  0.191***  0.177***
( 6.20) ( 4.17) ( 11.83) ( 6.86)
R2 or  2 statistic 0.392 0.382 981.1*** 356.8***
Speciﬁcation 2
Job-education somewhat related  0.064***  0.095***  0.144***  0.124***
( 6.26) ( 4.98) ( 15.08) ( 8.24)
Pay and promotion opportunities 0.041 0.187**  0.141***  0.066
(1.17) (2.19) ( 4.64) ( 1.05)
Working conditions  0.259***  0.250  0.006  0.112
( 2.96) ( 1.43) ( 0.08) ( 1.16)
Job location  0.340***  0.253**  0.253***  0.055
( 4.71) ( 2.16) ( 4.16) ( 0.51)
Family-related reasons  0.228**  0.481***  0.290***  0.193***
( 2.50) ( 4.07) ( 5.56) ( 3.41)
Job not available in ﬁeld  0.249***  0.219***  0.338***  0.358***
( 6.02) ( 2.68) ( 16.85) ( 11.63)
Change in career/professional   0.086**  0.166**  0.046 0.007
interests ( 2.36) ( 2.16) ( 1.56) (0.14)
Other reason  0.177**  0.241**  0.255***  0.280***
( 2.49) ( 2.14) ( 6.16) (5.91)
R2 or  2 statistic 0.395 0.368 1072.4*** 404.8***
Notes:Numbers under coeﬃcient estimates are t-statistics. Marginal eﬀects from the job satisfaction or-
dered probit regressions are shown for the probability of being in the highest job satisfaction category.
The probability for males and females to be in the highest job satisfaction category (based on average
characteristics) is 0.536 and 0.502, respectively. All variables from table 7.4 are also included in the esti-
mations.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.working outside one’s education in order to earn more comes with reduced
job satisfaction. When looking within genders, it is clear that even for
women who reported a more than 20 percent increase in earnings associ-
ated with working outside their educational ﬁeld in order to improve pay
and promotion opportunities, the move brought no improvement in job
satisfaction. More generally, to the extent that job satisfaction can be taken
as an indicator of utility, the fact that mismatch is never associated with in-
creased utility (even when associated with increased income) further illus-
trates its high social costs.7
7.4 Using the Panel Data
One of the important aspects of the SDR is its longitudinal design.
While not all variables are available in all years, we undertake a series of
panel estimates to conﬁrm the largely cross-sectional results of the previ-
ous sections. In particular, we are concerned that workers who are less pro-
ductive will naturally earn less and, perhaps, be less satisﬁed and subject to
greater turnover. Yet the fact that they are less productive also makes such
workers more likely to be mismatched. To the extent that our controls in
the previous cross-sectional analysis do not capture diﬀerences in produc-
tivity, the associations we have shown run the risk of merely reﬂecting ﬁxed
worker eﬀects rather than the true inﬂuence of an exogenous mismatch.
This may be especially true if being matched, closely related to one’s edu-
cation, is the result of winning a tournament.
In order to examine this issue, we use ﬁve waves of the public-use SDR
sample for 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001. As mentioned, job satisfac-
tion is only available in 1997 and the ﬁnest breakdown by discipline is un-
available in the public-use data. An additional limitation of the public-use
data is that annual earnings are rounded to the nearest thousand and top-
coded at $150,000. Recognizing these limitations, we use the public-use
data to estimate an earnings equation across these ﬁve waves (in 2001 dol-
lars). Accounting for individual ﬁxed eﬀects, the unbalanced panel esti-
mation examines the role of mismatch on earnings. The variables that are
constant across waves (such as race and gender) drop out of the estimation,
while the coeﬃcients on the mismatch variables reﬂect the consequences of
individual workers changing in the degree of mismatch. However, these co-
eﬃcients should be purged of the role of individual eﬀects, such as lower
productivity, that might simultaneously generate both mismatch and lower
earnings.
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7. The augmented estimation of the turnover equations were also estimated. There were
fewer statistically signiﬁcant reasons for mismatch. The importance of the absence of jobs
and the change in career interests emerged as positive determinants of turnover. There were
no signiﬁcant negative determinants of turnover and there were few diﬀerences by gender.Table 7.7 presents the estimations and reveals that all of the coeﬃcients
on the mismatch variables remain negative and all but one statistically sig-
niﬁcant. This happens despite the errors in variables associated with the
public-use sample. Academics no longer show a larger earnings penalty for
mismatch. The penalty for education and job not relating at all is essen-
tially the same for men and women. Most notably, and as anticipated, con-
trolling for ﬁxed eﬀects causes the coeﬃcients themselves to be smaller. In-
deed, the percentage penalty associated with mismatch is roughly half the
size, on average, as that estimated in the cross-section. We are quick to em-
phasize that this should be taken with care as the speciﬁcation and con-
struction of the variables diﬀer between the two sets of estimations.
Nonetheless, the ﬁxed eﬀect estimates emerge as smaller, but still negative
and typically statistically signiﬁcant.
In addition to controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects, the panel data can help inform
the extent to which mismatch reﬂects temporary disequilibrium. Rubb
(2003) has estimated that in general samples, less than one in ﬁve overedu-
cated workers moves to being matched within one year. Beginning with the
group of workers that are in jobs either not related or only somewhat re-
lated to their education in 1997, 25.7 percent reported closely related jobs
in 1999 and slightly more, 27.0 percent, reported closely related jobs four
years later in 2001. Thus, the vast majority of those mismatched in the core
year of our study remain so four years later, suggesting that mismatch and
Educational Mismatch among Ph.D.s  247
Table 7.7 Mismatch earnings penalties from ﬁxed effects regressions
Variable Full Academic Nonacademic Female Male
Job-education somewhat   0.014***  0.011**  0.015***  0.009  0.008*
related ( 3.71) ( 2.01) ( 2.63) ( 1.02) ( 1.82)
Job-education not at all   0.066***  0.026**  0.064***  0.056***  0.052***
related ( 9.07) ( 2.00) ( 6.66) ( 3.29) ( 6.56)
R2: within 0.141 0.139 0.098 0.139 0.149
R2: between 0.373 0.413 0.266 0.174 0.302
R2: overall 0.328 0.371 0.239 0.166 0.264
Variance of ﬁxed eﬀect 0.447 0.423 0.497 0.525 0.436
Variance of the error term 0.306 0.257 0.321 0.363 0.290
  0.681 0.730 0.706 0.677 0.693
Notes:Variables are in comparison to those who report their job and education are closely matched. The
number under the coeﬃcient estimates are t-statistics. Data are from the 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, and
2001 SDR public-use ﬁles. Earnings are in 2001 U.S. dollars. Other controls include: experience, experi-
ence squared, supervises individuals, full-time contract, U.S. citizenship, main activity is teaching, main
activity is management, main activity is computer work, main activity is other, and principle job is
mid/top level manager. The proportion of the variance due to the ﬁxed eﬀect is  .
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.its consequences are persistent.8 Yet, focusing on job-changers presents a
rather diﬀerent picture. First, of those who closely relate in 1997, 13.2 per-
cent report a job change by 1999. This compares to 22.4 percent of those
who did not relate in 1997 reporting a job change by 1999. Second, 48.7
percent of those job-changers who did not relate in 1997 report improving
the quality of their match by 1999. Thus, there remains movement out of
mismatch toward better matches. This movement, together with the ﬁxed
eﬀect estimate, suggests that mismatch indicates something beyond merely
a proxy for low ability and losing a tournament.
7.4.1 The Inﬂuence of Experience on the Penalty for Mismatch
The complementarity between education and the experience gained
working in the ﬁeld of one’s education may generate a quality and quantity
of human capital not generated for those who are mismatched. As this pro-
cess of accumulating human capital and receiving a return on that invest-
ment takes time, it seems sensible that the penalty to being mismatched
may be small in the early years of a career but grow larger in the later years
of a career. To test this hypothesis we added interactions between the mis-
match indicators, how closely one’s education and job relate, and the ex-
perience and experience squared variables. These interactions were added
to the earnings speciﬁcation.
The results provide broad conﬁrmation that the penalty associated with
mismatch is larger for more experienced workers. The upper panel of ﬁg-
ure 7.1shows the predicted log earnings from a cross-sectional estimate for
a hypothetical female worker with mean female characteristics while the
lower panel repeats the exercise for a hypothetical male worker with mean
male characteristics. The pattern generally shows the lower earnings for
those in jobs that are only somewhat related and the still-lower earnings of
those in jobs that do not relate at all. As anticipated, the size of the penalty
associated with mismatch for older workers typically exceeds that for
younger workers. Men face a small penalty early in their careers for being
mismatched, but it grows dramatically. At thirty years of experience, the
penalty for being in a job that does not relate at all to education is $14,267
(a penalty of 18.2 percent), compared with only $2,883 (5.6 percent) at ﬁve
years of experience. Women face a penalty that starts larger than men, but
the penalty does not grow much over time. Thus, at thirty years of experi-
ence, the penalty for being in a job that does not relate at all is $9,570 (16.2
percent), compared with $6,446 (15.1 percent) at ﬁve years of experience.
The greatest penalty occurs at $10,161 (17.2 percent) at twenty-three years
of experience. Relatedly, the penalty for women whose job only somewhat
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8. The base group of workers in 1997 diﬀers between these two years because of attrition
that is substantial in the SDR. We did examine the determinants of those who dropped out
between 1997 and 1999, ﬁnding that mismatch itself is not a signiﬁcant determinant.relates compared to those whose job closely relates to their education in-
creases substantially as experience increases, from $837 (1.6 percent) at
ﬁve years of experience to $8,089 (10.3 percent) at thirty years of experi-
ence.
On the other hand, it might be argued that these cross-sectional esti-
mates identify diﬀerences across cohorts but give no guide as to what hap-
pens when a single cohort ages. We attempted to repeat the unbalanced
panel wage estimations with the experience-mismatch interactions for the
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Fig. 7.1 Cross-section based experience-earnings proﬁles by gender and 
degree of mismatch (top, female; bottom, male)ﬁve waves taken from the public-use sample. The coeﬃcients on the inter-
actions with experience come from the actual aging of workers as ﬁxed
eﬀects hold worker speciﬁc determinants constant. Note, however, that the
experience variables generally represent a trend across the waves and so
represent change over a decade. The estimations revealed no statistically
signiﬁcant interactions. This might suggest that correlations with unmea-
sured ability generated the diﬀerences over the experience proﬁle shown in
the cross-section. On the other hand, the constructed measure of experi-
ence required in the panel, the limitations of the public-use data used in the
panel, and the relatively short time of the panel all suggest that few ﬁrm
conclusions should be drawn.
7.5 Determinants of Mismatch
In an attempt to describe the mismatched we return to our broad mis-
match measures and estimate their determinants. For each of these vari-
ables, we use the broad controls examined to date as potential determi-
nants. As each of the mismatch variables has three ordered responses, the
estimations follow an ordered probit speciﬁcation measuring the degree of
mismatch. In general, the results suggest that mismatch is likely to result
from a dating of scientiﬁc skills.
The ﬁrst column of table 7.8 estimates the extent of mismatch as mea-
sured by the closeness of job and education. The results indicate that the
likelihood of mismatch increases with experience but at a decreasing rate.
However, the coeﬃcients are such that the likelihood of mismatch in-
creases (the net coeﬃcient across both terms is positive) until thirty-six
years of experience. Thus, throughout most of a scientist’s work life the
chance of mismatch increases with experience. This pattern is reinforced
by the speciﬁcations using the other measures of mismatch and tends to in-
dicate that mismatch is associated with retaining an older vintage of scien-
tiﬁc knowledge and skills.
Married men, those working full time, and supervisors are less likely to
report being mismatched. Similarly, those in academia and government are
less likely to report being mismatched. Compared to those who primarily
do research, those who have a primary activity of teaching are less likely to
be mismatched, but those who manage are more likely to be mismatched.
The latter correlation would tend to support the commonly observed ca-
reer path within private industry where scientists move from the lab to 
the front oﬃce, or within academia where they leave the lab for adminis-
tration. Again, this may reﬂect the vintage of scientiﬁc skills. This transi-
tion might be evidenced by the fact that those in the largest employers are
more likely to be mismatched. These workplaces have the largest internal
labor markets and longest career ladders and can more easily make such
transitions available to scientists. Interestingly, those who have a primary
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Job and  Likelihood of
education Expectations not adopting 
not related not similar same ﬁeld
Single female  6.9E-4 0.016*  0.002
( 0.23) (1.68) ( 0.30)
Married female  0.004 0.007  0.005
( 1.56) (0.88) ( 0.82)
Married male  0.009***  0.021***  0.018***
( 3.91) ( 3.11) ( 2.90)
Asian, non-Hispanic 1.4E-3  0.015** 0.071***
(0.67) ( 2.48) (10.84)
Hispanic  0.002 0.002  0.011
( 0.42) (0.16) ( 1.05)
Black, non-Hispanic 0.004  3.5E-4  0.003
(0.79) ( 0.03) ( 0.31)
Other race, non-Hispanic 0.006 0.003 0.012
(0.48) (0.12) (0.44)
Experience 1.2E-3*** 0.008*** 0.002***
(4.96) (10.87) (3.34)
Experience squared  1.8E-5***  1.2E-4***  1.1E-4***
( 2.88) ( 6.65) ( 6.26)
Supervisor  0.012***  0.023***  0.030***
( 7.51) ( 5.02) ( 7.07)
Full time  0.006*  0.030***  0.008
( 1.87) ( 3.00) ( 0.98)
Pension  0.013***  0.010  0.033***
( 4.65) ( 1.32) ( 4.57)
Health insurance 0.003 0.002 0.025***
(1.08) (0.20) (3.19)
Proﬁt sharing 0.004** 6.0E-4  0.016***
(2.22) (0.10) ( 3.02)
Employer size   1,000 and   5,000 0.006 0.010 0.014
(1.35) (0.91) (1.34)
Employer size   5,000 0.007*** 0.004 0.016***
(3.66) (0.67) (3.19)
Academic  0.035***  0.112***  0.039***
( 15.03) ( 17.39) ( 6.72)
Government  0.009***  0.006  0.009
( 4.12) ( 0.77) ( 1.28)
Teaching is main activity  0.012***  0.021***  0.016***
( 5.87) ( 3.24) ( 2.80)
Management is main activity 0.039*** 0.154*** 0.042***
(10.07) (15.79) (5.60)
Computer is main activity 0.060*** 0.143*** 0.069***
(8.32) (8.69) (5.16)
Other main activity 0.023*** 0.072*** 0.034***
(6.80) (8.26) (4.78)
Computer discipline 0.257*** 0.253*** 0.021
(8.57) (8.53) (1.17)
(continued)activity of using the computer are also more likely to be mismatched. This
may reﬂect that some of those who are mismatched have been forced to re-
duce the scope of their knowledge to a single activity, often in a supportive
rather than lead research role.
Finally, the pattern of ﬁelds may be seen as further evidence on the role
of vintage. The ﬁelds that are least likely to be mismatched are economics
(the base category) and other social science, while those among the most
likely to be mismatched are hard science, computer science, and health sci-
ence. Such a pattern might be expected if the vintage of knowledge is less
crucial in the former ﬁelds than in the latter ﬁelds. Another way of putting
this is that the speed of change in the former ﬁelds is much slower than in
the latter ﬁelds, making mismatch less likely.
7.6 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the consequences of job mismatch—lack of
ﬁt between education and jobs—among the most highly-educated workers
in the economy. These workers of the knowledge economy are often thought
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Mathematics discipline 0.051*** 0.028  6.0E-4
(3.79) (1.51) ( 0.04)
Hard science discipline 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.027**
(5.36) (3.01) (2.07)
Social science discipline  0.015***  0.068***  0.011
( 3.21) ( 5.35) ( 0.90)
Engineering discipline 0.077*** 0.088*** 0.007
(5.71) (4.69) (0.54)
Management science discipline 0.146*** 0.208*** 0.013
(7.74) (9.12) (0.87)
Health science discipline 0.232*** 0.114***  0.003
(7.90) (4.53) ( 0.16)
Teacher discipline 0.148*** 0.100*** 0.027
(6.44) (4.37) (1.60)
Other (nonscience) discipline 0.411*** 0.449*** 0.092***
(12.22) (15.80) (4.52)
Chi Squared 4,894.7*** 4,957.5*** 888.8***
Notes: The number under the coeﬃcient estimates are t-statistics. The coeﬃcients are the
marginal eﬀects of being in the most mismatched category from ordered probit estimations.
All estimates use sample weights and include controls for the region of the country.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Table 7.8 (continued)
Job and  Likelihood of
education Expectations not adopting 
not related not similar same ﬁeldto be critical for technological progress and growth. Understanding the
consequences of mismatch is important when considering governmental
policies toward scientiﬁc education, including issues of subsidizing stu-
dents, supporting universities, and encouraging technology transfer.
The evidence assembled here uses three related measures of mismatch
from the Survey of Doctoral Recipients and estimates their inﬂuence on
three job outcomes: earnings, job satisfaction, and turnover. Mismatch is
associated with worse outcomes: lower wages, lower job satisfaction, and
higher turnover. This persists across substantial variations in estimation
and holds for academics and nonacademics and for men and women. The
size of these inﬂuences is surprisingly large, including a double-digit re-
duction in earnings, a 20 percent increase in the likelihood of being dissat-
isﬁed, and a one-third increase in the turnover rate. The ﬁxed eﬀect panel
estimates suggest a statistically signiﬁcant earnings penalty of about half
the size estimated in the cross-section.
While this chapter has not tried to estimate rates of return (either public
or private) on scientiﬁc education, one cannot help but be concerned about
the implications of these ﬁndings. The primary mismatch variable indicates
one in six academics report a degree of mismatch and nearly one in two
nonacademics report a degree of mismatch. Given the large share of mis-
matched workers and the apparently severe consequences of mismatch, a
thorough review of policy options would seem in order.
Our attempts to estimate the determinants of mismatch suggest that
there may be substantial vintage eﬀects at work as the ﬁelds in which the
knowledge base changes most quickly appear to be associated with a
greater chance of being mismatched. Also, there appears to be conﬁrma-
tion of the typical pattern of moving from the ﬁrst line of science research
into more administrative positions as scientists age. Moreover, the inﬂu-
ences of the reasons for mismatch are particularly interesting. Those who
are mismatched in an attempt to earn more, do earn more but remain less
satisﬁed. This is intriguing and suggests greater inquiry into exactly what
these individuals do and whether they regret the decision to remain
matched. If they do, it might be worth considering the options for recreat-
ing matches.
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